Despite the fact that no U.S. bombers are currently on alert, the force can be generated to alert status very rapidly significantly increasing the total number of warheads on alert.
This rapid increase in retaliatory potential sends a clear signal of national resolve -a basic component of deterrence -that cannot be matched by the other legs of the Triad. 10
THE THREAT TODAY
There are, without a doubt, significant changes in the nature of the threat today compared to the threat that our defenses were built to defend against during the Cold War.
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The world is by no means, however, a safer place today, as some would argue, than It was then.
The Soviet threat has changed significantly. Today, aggression by the Soviet Union Is highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, the USSR remains a major military power with the capacity to destroy U.S. society. With the shift from a predominantly bipolar to a more multipolar world, U.S. security policy has a new geographic focus on potential conflicts beyond Europe and a new strategic concern with the proliferation of advanced technologies -nuclear and non-nuclear.
The Persian Gulf conflict has had a major short-term impact on U.S. defense planning and priorities, shifting resources from Europe to the Gulf and delaying planned force reductions. The war also dramatized the risks inherent in the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and elsewhere.
by the year 2000, It is estimated that at least 15 developing nations will have the ability to build ballistic missiles -eight of which either have or are near to acquiring nuclear capabilities.
Thirty countries will have chemical weapons, and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons as well. 13
The erosion of NATO's role and influence is another major area of concern for the United States. This trend seems likely to proceed further. Absence of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union weakens the rationale for NATO. Out of all the missic.ns flown by the F-117 to date, not one of the.m has been touched by enemy anti-aircraft fire.
Every single one of them had returned to base safely, without a scratch on it, because of that technology. 26
In the case of the B-2 and other stealthy aircraft, we have a dramatic lead In this particular set of technologies and the potential to sustain that lead for many years. Without an aircraft like the B-2, the bomber fleet will atrophy and bomber penetration capabilities will decline.
Together, these events will lead to eventual disintegration of the balanced Triad concept mentioned early In this paper.
By the The B-2 enjoys important advantages over existing bombers, which stem from a revolutionary blending of stealth technologies in a large aircraft with high aerodynamic efficiency and large payload capability. The B-2"s higher survivability enables it to fly at higher altitudes to provide a better field of view for the crew and the aircraft sensor suite. Its low observability allows more flexible routing which is driven by mission requirements rather than the threat. Other types of bombers will be restricted to operating at low altitudes with limited sensor field of view under strict routing restrictions and stringent fuel limits.
In combination, the B-21s enhanced survivability and high 20 aerodynamic efficiency for greater range and search time will provide the baseline aircraft with greater capabilities against a wider variety of targets than existing bombers.
Built-in potential for improvements can provide even greater capability in the future. 30
Unlike the B-52, which was first produced to be a high altitude bomber, the B-2 has always had a penetrating mission attached to it.
Mission:
The ASPA (Advanced Strategic Penetrating Bomber) shall provide the capability to conduct missions across the spectrum of conflict, including general nuclear war and the post-Single Integrated Operations Plan (SlOP) period, nuclear engagements less than general war, conventional conflict, and peacetime/ crisis situations. 31
As a viable penetrator, the B-2 will work synergistically to improve the capabilities of the air-breathing force as a whole. As the B-2 attacks the most heavily defended targets, the B-i will be able to concentrate on penetrating to less heavily defended targets, and the B-52 force, equipped with ALCMs and the ACMs, can conduct standoff attacks. This employment of the bomber force, in which each type of bomber attacks the most suitable targets, enhances the survivability and effectiveness of the bomber force as a whole to reinforce our deterrent potential.
B-2 COST
Critics of the B-2 program invariably look at the cost, without examining cost in the context of value. There is no doubt that the B-2 is an expensive airplane. But two factors stand out. First, the value of the B-2 In terms of its nuclear aeterrent capability, its contributions to arms control, the conventional capabilities, and Its revolutionary stealth technology Is enormous. Secondly, B-2 costs measure up favorably using many indices. 32
The B-2 will absorb a lower percentage of the defense budget during its three peak procurement years than the B-52 and other bombers did at their peak. In the three peak investment years, the B-2 consumes fewer dollars than the B-1 and the Minuteman ICBM.
The total program cost to build 75 B-2s was estimated by the DOD at $64.8 billion (including military construction) in "then year" dollars. Then year dollars is money as it is appropriated, not adjusted to a constant "base" year. "Congress has approved $33 billion for the production of only 15 production models and a single version for testing purposes. Congress also approved the purchase of major components for an additional five B-2s." 33
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The Air Force had estimated it would cost an additional $22 billion to build 60 more B-2s. Ending production after 20 planes would make the arcraft by far the most expensive ever built, driving the cost of each plane, including the program's development, to more than $2 billion. 34
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Northrop is vying for a subcontract on the Navy's AX stealth attack jet. Some of the shock could be absorbed by this project it the B-2 program gets cancelled.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The United States is at a crossroads of where It wants to go with the manned bomber. All signs are pointing to the conclusion that the B-2 could be the last bomber we will build. The questions are, how many do we need, and how will we use them?
By next year, our bomber inventory will be down to 200 aircraft. One-half of these aircraft will be over 30 years old. By 2010, the B-52G will be retired, the B-52H will be over 50 years old, and the B-1B will be over 23 years old.
It's obvious that without the B-2, the bomber leg of the -Tailless, all-flying wing design with smooth surface -Thirty year operational life. contours, unbroken outer surface lines and extensive use of composites. Recessed engines with top-of--Built on prcduction hard tooling versus standard wing inlets and exhaust, hand building of prototypes. Exacting standards and use of composites required precision tolin fabrica--Aerodynamically dean design and large wing area tion, and manufacturing capabilities not edsting in result in wing loading second only to U-2/TR-1 and industry at the outset of the B-2 program. Producigreater range per pound of fuel than other bombers bility had to be proven along with aircraft capability. (eg, uses 40-50% fewer tankers than B-IB/B-52 for similar missions).
. Most extensively tested aircraft in history before first flight: over 550,000 hours on systems and coin--B-2 flights show it handles like a fighter in agility, ponents. responsiveness and precision, in part because composites give it more rigidity than large aircraft like the B-52." 
